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In order to obtain detection range requirement of a new radar system, a 
computer simulation model is developed to evaluate the capability of the radar in an 
anti-air defense operation. Since the anti-ship missile is not available for test and 
evaluation, a technjque to specify the performance requirement and design the test 
and evaluation plane using an airplane is developed. The effects of the propagation 







The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research 
may not be applicable to all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and 
logic errors, they can not be considered validated. Any use of these programs is at 
the risk of the user. 
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Radar systems play a key role in most modern shipboard combat systems. 
Their all-weather functioning capability at long ranges is unmatched by that of other 
sensors. They are also among the few sensors capable of providing accurate range 
information. Their shipboard applications include air surveillance and traffic control, 
surface search and navigation, target acquisition and close-in weapon systems control, 
and target illumination for semi-active rni sile homing. 
Radar system development involves a wide variety of technologies and 
consumes the navy budget heavily. Typically, a radar design cycle takes five to ten 
years to complete. It approaches technical obsolescence and requires upgrade within 
two years of initial deployment. Therefore, to avoid being driven to obsolescence 
due to increased threat upon its deployment, a new radar system has to be designed 
to meet a threat environment anticipated by the fleet in ten years. How to specify 
the operational requirements of a radar for a still non-existent threat and how to test 
the radar system when such a threat is not available are two important questions to 
be answered. 
The operational requirements define the basic performance characteristics of 
the radar system to be acquired. Usually, it is prepared by the system user and 
approved by an authorization committee. It is the basis for system development. If 
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the operational requirements are prudentially and accurately determined, the new 
radar should meet what the fleet desires. 
Exact system performance specification is the rule for every military system 
acquisition program. Through a clear understanding of the operational requirements, 
it is possible to specify system performance exactly. The required performance 
determines the critical issues of the system. To ensure that the new radar meets the 
requirements, all critical issues have to be included in the test and evaluation master 
plan (TEMP). It is clear that a critical issue which cannot be tested should never be 
specified . How, then, can one specify the performance requirements and design test 
plans against a non-existent or unavailable threat? In this thesis, the problem of 
developing a surveillance radar to counter an unavailable threat is considered. The 
use of an alternative, readily available threat target for radar performance 
specification and test and evaluation is studied. 
In what follows, some operational requirements of a new shipboard surveillance 
radar to detect incoming low flying missiles will be determined through threat 
scenario simulation. Its performance parameter will then be specified in terms of the 
detection of a high flying aircraft. Performance evaluation of the radar can be 
carried out against the aircraft. The effectiveness of the radar against the anticipated 
threat will be deduced from its performance against the aircraft. 
This work attempts to demonstrate the methodology of utilizing currently 
available technical tools to assist in radar system acquisition. The threat scenario, 
the anti-air warfare (AA W) capability and the surveillance and tracking radar 
2 
reaction times are all flexible: they are different for different navies of the world. 
Therefore, the system characteristics adopted in this thesis are chosen to describe 
reasonable scenarios only. They do not correspond to any current weapons and radar 
systems, nor are they expectations of any in the future. 
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II. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Operational requirements define the basic performance required of a new 
radar. Before a new radar is designed, the following items are considered to 
generate the threat environment and determine the operational requirements of the 
radar: 
(1) The results of previous operational exercises or warfare. 
(2) The system developments of enemy (or potential enemy). 
(3) The tactical thought invented by tacticians. 
( 4) The development tendency of future naval weapons and warfare. 
Once the threat environment is determined, it should be straight forward to find 
the performance requirements of the new radar if an exercise of practicing forces can 
be arranged according to the threat scenario. There are several difficulties need to 
considered: 
(1) This requires a lot of personnel and equipment which may not be 
economical. 
(2) Some desired situations are difficult to model. 
(3) Threat systems are not easily obtained or simulated. 
( 4) The new radar has not been produced, and its actual performance can not 
be ascertained. 
(5) The effects of combining with other systems are not easily predictable. 
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Therefore, to obtain an operational requirement, practicing forces are seldom 
employed to model a situation. So far war games or computer simulations are often 
used. Although they are not real world situations, they allow even the most stressful 
situation to be attempted and evaluated. In addition, they are economical and not 
requiring real threat forces or systems. 
Computer simulation is utilized in this thesis. A threat scenario is set. A 
FORTRAN simulation program is used which runs on the IBM/370 mainframe 
computer at the Naval Postgraduate School. Through analyzing the results, the 
desired operational requirements are established. 
A. SCENARIO AND OUTLINE 
A scenario is defined a~, "an outli ne of the plot of dramatic work, giving 
particulars as to the scenes, characters, situations, etc." A scenario is a description 
of an imaginary situation that will be used to simulate real system operation during 
a test. Therefore, a scenario is prepared to provide all detailed descriptive materials 
necessary to determine the operational requirements to accomplish the following 
mission: 
( 1) Developing and exercising of realistic models and/ or simulations of systems 
to obtain required information about system characteristics and operational 
performance. 
(2) Permit conducting of realistic two-sided exercises to determine the ability 
of systems to achieve operational missions [Ref. 1]. 
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The following is an example of determining the operational requirements 
through computer simulation of a scenario. 
******* Scenario -- Anti-Ship Missile Defense Operation 
1. Red Force: 
******* 
The SSN-X anti-surface missiles of Red force are launched from either a 
ship, a submarine or an aircraft beyond the radar horizon of ships of the Blue force 
in a wave of missiles (TM) with a time lapse (TL) in seconds between each missile 
launched. 
2. Blue Force: 
(a) A ship of the Blue force is fitted with a modern surface surveillance 
radar, which provides ini ti al target information on the attack. The time delay 
between an incoming missile crossing the radar detection range and being detected 
by the radar system have been assumed to be normally distributed, with a mean delay 
time (MM) in seconds and a standard deviation (DM) in seconds. 
(b) The air defense of the ship rel ies on two short-range surface-to-air 
weapon systems. Each weapon system has an associated single-channel tracking 
radar. The tracking radar establishes a track after an incoming missile has been 
detected by the modern surface surveillance radar, assuming that the tracking radar 
is free to be assigned. For this model, the availability of each tracking radar is 
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assumed to be uniformly distributed in time, with a mean delay time (MT) in seconds 
and a standard deviation (DT) in seconds. 
(c) The ship has two close-in we3:pon systems (CIWS) also. Each close-in 
weapon system has its own radar to provide gun tracking information. When a target 
crosses the maximum firing range of a gun, the gun will start firing automatically to 
attack the target. This firing continues until the target crosses the minimum firing 
range of the gun. 
(d) The first short-range surface-to-air weapon system (FCS #1) will 
automatically engage a target which enters its engagement envelope. If more than 
one target are present or if the first system is busy, then CIWS #1 will automatically 
engage the target except when CIWS #1 is busy or when the target is outside its 
engagement envelope. 
(e) If the target is outside the engagement envelope of both CIWS, then 
FCS #2 will immediately engage this target except when FCS #2 is busy also. 
(f) When both CIWS and FCS are busy, or two FCS are busy and the 
target is outside the engagement envelope of the close-in weapon systems (CIWS), 
the target will be put in a waiting queue until one of the systems is free or until the 
target crosses the maximum engagement range of one of the two CIWS. 
3. Performance Data: 
(a) The anti-ship missiles of Red force: 
- Radar cross section each of the missiles = 0.1 meter2 
- Missile velocity = SPM meter /second 
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- Combined in-flight reliability and hit probability for each missile is 
PM 
(b) The short-range surface-to-air missiles of Blue force: 
- Minimum launch range = RMI meters 
-Maximum launch range = RMA meters 
-Average missile velocity = SPA meter/second 
- Reliability ( at intercept ) and Hit / Kill probability = PA 
(c) The close-in weapon systems of Blue force: 
- Minimum fire range = RMIC meters 
- Maximum fire range = RMAC meters 
- Kill probability = 0.2/second * total available engage time 
4. Scenario Simulation 
The computer program developed can be used to simulate this scenario 
and to determine the defense capability of a blue force ship at 40 different detection 
ranges. The results are plotted. The program will find the required detection range 
of the surface surveillance radar with a success confidence interval of 95%. 
B. DISCRETE-EVENT SIMULATION 
Discrete-event simulation concerns the modeling of a system as it evolves over 
time. The state variables will change only at a countable or discrete times. These 
points in time are determined by the instant an event occurs. An event is defined 
to be an instantaneous occurrence which may change the state of a system [Ref. 2]. 
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Since this scenario simulates the engagement of several weapon systems which 
will pass via different routines and different time periods determined by a random 
number generator, the state variables may change randomly at a countable number 
of times. The discrete-event simulation model thus adequately describes the re.quired 
situation. 
1. Time-Advance Mechanism 
Because of the dynamic nature of discrete-event simulation models, the current 
value of the simulated time has to be tracked as the simulation proceeds. A 
mechanism is also required to advance the simulated time from one value to another. 
In this simulation "the next-event time-advance" is used. The simulation clock is first 
initialized to zero. The simulation clock is then advanced to the time of the most 
imminent (first occurring) of the future events. At this point, the state of the system 
is updated to account for the fact that an event has occurred. The time of the 
occurrence of this event is also updated. This process of advancing the simulation 
clock from one event time to another is continued until eventually some prescribed 
stopping condition is satisfied. In the "next-event time-advance" mechanism, all state 
changes occur only at event times for a di crete-event simulation model. Periods of 
inactivity in a system are skipped over by jumping the clock from event time to event 
time [Ref. 2]. 
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2. Components 
Discrete-event simulation models always have a number of common 
components. In this simulation, the next-eve.nt time-advance mechanism is used 
which includes the foll owing components. 
a. Input Parameters 
This scenario does not use a lot of pre-set parameters. The user will 
input parameters suitable for a desired situation, so parameters like SR, IR, SPM, 
SPA, PM, P A, .. . etc. 
· b. System State 
The collection of state variables of the systems, STATUS(1), 
STATUS(2), STATUS(3), and STATUS(4) stand for the states of the FCS #1 and 
#2, CIWS #1 and #2. STATUS(I) = 1 if the system is busy, STATUS(I) = 0 if the 
system is id le. 
c. Simulation Clock 
In this simulation, the variable TIME gives the current value of 
simulation time in seconds. It is updated by the next-event time-advance mechanism. 
d. Statistical Counters 
Variables (such as NH, NIQ, NM, NR, .. ) used for storing the desired 
information or statistical quantities about system performance. 
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e. Initialization Routine 
The subroutine INIT initialize the variables TIME, STATUS(!), NM, 
NIQ, TNE(J) at simulation time zero. 
f Timing Routine 
The subroutine TIM determines the next event from the event list and 
then advances the simulation clock to the time when the event is to occur. 
g. Evenl Routine 
The subroutine ENG (and INIT, DEPl, DEP2, DEP3, DEP4), 
initialize and updates the system state when a particular type of event occurs. 
h Report Generator 
The subroutine REPT, computes estimates of the desired measures 
of performance and prints a report after each run. 
L Main Program 
The MAIN program handles all the simulations as it proceeds. 
3. Organization 
The logical relationships among the above components for each simulation 
run are shown in Fig. 1. The simulation begins at time zero when the main program 
calls the initial ization routine. The simulation clock is set to zero. The system state 
and the statistical counters are initialized. The event list is also initialized. After 
control has been returned to the main program, it calls the timing routine to 
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Figure 1 The relationships between the components m the simulation. After 
Ref. 2 
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occur, the simulation clock is advanced to the time of this event of type I. Then 
control is returned to the main program. Next the main program calls the event 
routine I. Three types of activities occur: 
(1) update the system state to account for the fact that an event of 
type I has occurred. 
(2) gather information about system performance by updating the 
statistical counters. 
(3) generate the time of occurrences of future events and add these 
information to the event list. 
After all processing of an event routine has been completed, either 
in the event routine or in the main program, a check is made to determine whether 
the simulation should be terminated. If it is time to terminate the simulation, the 
report generator is called from main program to compute estimates (from the 
statistical counters) of the desired performance measures and to print a report. If 
it is not time to terminate, control is passed back to the main program and the main 
program routine check cycle is continued until the stopping condition is eventually 
satisfied. 
C. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
The computer program to simulate this scenario is listed in Appendix A. In 
addition to the main program, there are subroutines and functions called by the main 
program. Table 1 shows the subroutines, functions and variables the program uses: 
13 
Name Purpose 
INIT Initialization routine 
TIM Timing routine 
ENG Event routine which processes the engagement of the four 
weapon systems and the time the next missile is detected 
DEP Event routine which processes the departure time of each system 
REPT Generates report 
LNORM A normal distribution random number generator 
LRND A uniform distribution random number generator 
Table 1. Subroutines, functions, and variables for the program 
1. Main Program 
The flowchart for the MAIN program is shown in Fig. 2. The MAIN 
program begins with the MODEL common block. The variables in MODEL are the 
ones required to be global variables. They also specify the positive seeds for the 
normal distribution random number generator (LNORM) and the uniform 
distribution random number generator (LRND). The reason for using 1103205531 
as the seed for both generators is that it is not easy to repeat. The program also 
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Figure 2 The flowchart of the MAIN PROGRAM 
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opens a file to write results. 
The common declaration statement is followed by the specification of the 
number of runs for the simulation. In order t~ . get an accurate simulated result, the 
scenario is set to run for 1000 times. 
The main purpose of this program is to simulate the scenario stated above. 
It is run for forty different radar detection ranges. From among these forty ranges, 
the minimum at which the ship successfully defeats the missile attack at the 95 % 
confidence level is considered as the operational requirement. 
The scenario simulation is started by calling subroutine INIT to initialize 
the simulation at TIME = 0. The timing routine, subroutine TIM, is called to 
determine the event type, NEXT. This will determine the next event to occur and 
to advance the simulation clock (TIME) to the time of occurrence of the next event. 
Then a computed go to statement based on NEXT is used to pass control to the 
appropriate event routine. If NEXT = 1, the event routine ENG is called to process 
the engagement and determine the time when the next missile is detected. If NEXT 
= 2 (or 3, 4, 5), event routine DEP 1 (or 2, 3, 4) is called to process the departure 
of a missile after completing the engagement. This is the next-event time-advance 
approach. After control is returned to the main program from ENG or DEP, a 
check is made to see if the ship is hit by the last missile or the wave of missile attack 
is over. The program also checks if the total run time for a wave of attack exceed 
the prescribed limit. If this limit is exceeded, the wave of attack is also considered 
as over. If the ship is hit by the last missile or the wave of missile attack is over, 
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INIT is called and the simulation is repeated until 1000 runs are done. The 
simulation of missile attack for a given radar detection range is then considered to 
be completed. REPT will then be called to compute and file the result, and the 
simulation for the next radar detection range begins. Mter simulated results at 40 
different detection ranges are obtained, the program will be terminated. 
The program as described above can be nested in one more layer of do-
loop in which the total number of incoming missiles can be varied. 
2. Subroutine INIT 
Flowchart of this subroutine is shown in Fig. 3. The program is quite 
straightforward. It initialize the simulation clock, the statistical counter, the variables 
of states and the event list. The time the first missile is detected by the surveillance 
radar, TNE(l), is determined by calling a normal distribution random number 
generator (LNORM) with a mean delay time (MM) and a standard deviation (DM) 
in seconds. Since no other missile is present at TIME = 0, the time of the next 
event, TNE(2), TNE(3), TNE( 4), and TNE(5), are set to l.E+ 30. This will 
guarantee that the first event will be ENG. 
3. Subroutine TIM 
Flowchart of this subroutine is given in Fig. 4. At TIME = 0 the program 
sets NEXT to 1. Mter the first run, the program compares TNE(2), TNE(3), ... 
TNE(NEVENTS) and sets NEXT equal to the event type whose time of occurrence 
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Figure 4 The flowchart of subroutine TIM 
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No 
RMIN=TNE ( I) 
NEHT=I 
chosen event type, namely TNE(NEXT). 
4. Subroutine ENG 
Subroutine ENG is a major subroutine of this simulation. A flowchart of 
this subroutine is shown in Fig. 5. The purpose of this subroutine is to simulate the 
engagement scenario. The subroutine begins by scheduling the detection time of the 
next arriving missile. Then a check is made to determine whether FCS #1 is busy, 
i.e., if STATUS( 1) = 1. If FCS # 1 is idle, then the program uses Routine A to 
process the simulation. Fig. 6 shows the flowchart of Routine A. Routine A processes 
the simulation according to the following procedures: 
(1) Schedules the time for FCS #1 to establish track. 
(2) Calculates the distance between the missile and FCS #1. 
(3) Checks whether the distance of the missile is greater than the effective 
range of FCS #1. If the missile is outside the range of FCS #1, the program 
schedules the time the missile comes inside the maximum effective range. It then 
updates the simulation clock and checks the missile location again. If the missile 
distance is shorter than the minimum effective range of FCS #1, the program calls 
Routine B. If the missile falls within the effective range of FCS #1, Routine A 
simulates the engagement of FCS #1 with this missile until the missile leaves its 
effective range, being destroyed, or the defense by FCS # 1 is deemed unsuccessful. 
Therefore, changing the state of FCS #1, scheduling the engagement time, and 
checking whether the defense is successful are required. If it is not a successful 
defense, then FCS # 1 engages the missile again. Otherwise, an intercept time, 
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2. HT= I 
( Return ) 
TNE(3) is scheduled. 
On the other hand, if FCS # 1 is busy, CIWS # 1 will automatically engage 
the missile. If the missile is within the maximum effective range of crws #1, 
Routine B is called to simulate the engagement. Figure 7 shows the flowchart of 
Routine B. Routine B processes the simulation according to the following procedures: 
(1) Checks whether the distance of the missile is smaller than the 
minimum range of crws #1. If the distance is smaller, it uses routine 1 to check 
whether the ship is hit by the missile or not. If the answer is positive, it adds 1 to 
the NH counter, set HT = 1. Otherwise the missile is within the effective range of 
crws #1. 
program: 
(2) Checks whether CIWS #1 is busy. If CIWS #1 is idle, then the 
- changes the state of crws # 1; 
- determines the kill probability of crws #1 ; 
- determines whether the defense is successful. If it is a successful 
defense, then schedules a intercept time, TNE(3) and return to the main 
program. Otherwise, since there is no time to engage again, routine 1 is 
used to check whether the ship is hit. 
(3) If crws #1 is busy, the program checks whether crws #2 is busy. If 
crws #2 is also busy, routine 1 is employed. If it is idle, follow the procedure (2) 
except that the intercept time is stored in TNE(5). 
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When the distance between the missile and the CIWS is greater than the 
maximum effective range of CIWS, the program checks if FCS #2 is busy. If it is 
idle, the Routine A is followed. If it is busy, the program checks if the distance 
between target and the ship, RA, is greater than the maximum effective range of the 
CIWS. 
If the RA is greater than the maximum effective range of the CIWS, 1 is 
added to NIQ and the control is returned to the main program. Otherwise, Routine 
B is followed. 
5. Subroutine DEP 
Subroutines DEP1 through DEP4 share the same flowchart, Fig. 8. Each 
of these subroutines corresponds to an individual weapon system, DEP1 for FCS #1, 
DEP2 for CIWS #1, DEP3 for FCS #2, DEP4 for CIWS #2. 
These subroutines schedule the departure of the anti-ship missile after an 
engagement by resetting the systems to idle, and setting TNE(I + 1) to 'infinity'. 
When the number in queue, NIQ, is greater than 1, these subroutines reduce 1 from 
NIQ, set TNE(I + 1) to 'infinity', let TNE(l) equal to TIME (this procedure allow the 
next-event time-advance mechanism to select the ENG route) and make the system 
busy again. 
D. RESULTS OF SIMULATION 
There are several parameters which can be varied in the simulation program: 
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Figure 8 The flowchart of subroutine DEP 
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No 
TNE(I+l )=1 .£+30 
missiles and CIWS of the defending ship, the time delay in detection after an anti-
ship missile comes within detection range of the search radar and the time delay for 
the tracking radar to acquire the target after the target information is handed over 
from the search radar. In what follows, radar detection range requirements as 
determined from simulations using two different sets of parameters are presented. 
1. Situation 1: 
The situation is set as the following: 
Red Force: 
Anti-ship missile: 
speed: 500 meters/second 
km probability (include reliability): 0.72 
time laps between each missile launched: 5.0 seconds 
Blue Force: 
Short range surface-to-air missile: 
speed: 1000 meters/second 
kill probability: 0.81 
effective range: 2000 to 10000 meters 
Close-in weapon system: 
effective range: 200 to 2000 meters 
Surveillance radar delay time in detection: (gaussian distribution) 
mean: 10.0 seconds 
deviation : 2.0 seconds 
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Tracking radar acquisition time: (gaussian distribution) 
mean: 2.0 seconds 
deviation: 1.0 second 
The kill probabilities, effective ranges and speeds of the attacking and r-
defending missiles under this situation are dose to the capabilities of existing ones. 
The delay times of both the surveillance radar and the tracking radar are on the long 
side. This situation can be considered as a test of the capability of radars currently 
. . 
m service. 
The percentage of successful defense as a function of the detection range 
of the surveillance radar is given in Fig. 9. The total number of anti-ship missiles is 
varied from 4 to 10. It can be seen from this figure that the 95% successful defense 
against the missiles requires a radar detection range of about 11000 meters. It 
appears that the total number of attacking missiles does not strongly influence the 
percentage of successful defense when the radar detection range is large. It is 
conjectured that, if the radar detection range is far enough, the weapons systems of 
the defending ship engages a fixed number of the attacking missiles in an almost 
periodic manner, hence the probability of successful defense is independent of the 
number of incoming missiles. On the other hand, to achieve a fixed percentage of 
successful defense, the difference between two required radar ranges for two 
different numbers of incoming missiles appears to be fluctuating about a constant. 
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2. Situation 2: 
This situation is set as the following: 
Red Force: 
Anti-ship missile: 
speed: 700 meters/second 
kill probability (include reliability): 0.95 
time laps between each missile launched: 3.0 seconds 
Blue Force: 
Short range surface-to-air missile: 
speed: 1000 meters/second 
kill probability: 0.9 
effective range: 2000 to 15000 meters 
Close-in weapon system: 
effective range: 200 to 2000 meters 
Surveillance radar delay time in detection: (gaussian distribution) 
mean: 6.0 seconds 
deviation: 2.0 seconds 
Tracking radar acquisition time: (gaussian distribution) 
mean: 1.0 seconds 
deviation: 0.5 second 
In anticipation of the presence of faster and better missiles in the future, 
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(approximate Mach 2), with the probability of kill improved to 0.95 to simulate a 
more realistic threat. The anti-air missiles have the same speed of 1000 meters per 
second (approximate Mach 3) with an increased range of 15000 meters and an 
improved probability of kill of 0.9. (Note that the probability of kill usually depends 
upon the height, range and speed of the target which can be incorporated into the 
simulation program. It is treated as a constant in this thesis for simplicity.) Assume 
that this situation represents the expected environment, the result of the simulation 
will provide the desired operational requirement of the new surveillance radar. 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of successful defense as a function of the 
detection range of the surveillance radar. The total number of anti-ship missiles is 
varied from 5 to 8. The criterium of 95% successful defense against the incoming 
missiles is met if the radar detection range is about 10500 meters. This detection 
range of 10500 meters will be used as the operational requirement for the new 
surveillance radar in the next chapter. 
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III. SPECIFY DIFFICULT TO TEST PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Every military system acquisition program must accurately specify its system 
performance requirements. These requirements must be tested and evaluated. A 
performance specification which cannot be tested will create problems. The added 
cost to meet such a specification will only be wasted. When an operational 
requirement is based on an anticipated but unavailable threat, it is quite probable 
that the corresponding performance specification cannot be tested directly due to the 
lack in the actual targets or models. An alternative, easy to test performance 
specification should be used to replace the actual one. 
Assume that situation 2 of Chapter II is the scenario under which a new 
surveillance radar is expected to function. Assume that the missile used in that 
threat scenario is not expected to be available to the navy at the time when the radar 
is to be tested. An alternative target, may be an airplane or an RPV of a different 
radar cross section but of a similar speed, flown at a safer height, will be used as the 
substitute for planning the test and evaluation of the detection range of the radar. 
In this chapter, the way an alternative target can be used for the specification and 
testing of radar range performance will be demonstrated. 
A. RADAR RANGE EQUATION 
The radar range equation relates the detection range of a radar to the 
characteristics of its antenna, transmitter, receiver, and its anticipated target. Not 
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only is it useful for determining the maximum distance from the radar to the target 
at which detection can be made, but it also serves as a basis for radar design and as 
a tool for understanding radar operations. 
The new radar under consideration is assumed to be a monostatic pulse radar. 
Its receiving antenna, if not also used for transmission on a time-sharing basis, is 
located near its transmitting antenna so that the distances from the antennas to the 
target are essentially the same. It transmits pulses of durations very short compared 
to the pulse repetition time, with a peak power Pt. Hence only the radar equation 
for a monostatic pulse radar will be considered. 
1. Simple Form 
The simple form of the radar range equation is as the following: 
This is the fundamental form of the radar range equation. The maximum 
radar range, Rmax, is the distance within which a target of the specified radar cross 
section, o, can be detected for a specified probability of detection, P d, and a 
specified probability of false alarm, P fa . The radar fails to detect the target when 
the target echo signal power obtained by the receiving antenna falls below the 
minimum detectable signal, Smin. The transmitting gain, Gt, and the receiving gain, 
Gr, are assumed to be the same, G. Note that the radar cross section is the ratio 
of the estimated total radiated power of the target, computed by assuming that the 
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target radiates evenly in all directions as it does in the direction toward the receiving 
antenna, to the total power intercepted by the target [Ref 3]. Also note that, to 
apply the concept of radar cross section, the target must be in the far field of the 
radar antennas, and vice versa. For an unambiguous definition of the radar cross 
section, a single pulse must extend over the whole target. 
This simple form of the radar range equation does not consider the 
propagation environment of the radar. Therefore it does not adequately describe the 
performance of a radar. To improve the radar range equation so that its predictions 
will correlate better with the actual performance of a radar, the pattern-propagation 
factor [Ref. 4), or simply the propagation factor, F, has to be introduced. 
2. Pattern-Propagation Factor 
Including the propagation factor, the radar range equation is [Ref 4): 
R = 
Where 
P1 G1 G, a .l.. 2 r, F; ]114 
(4n)3 P, L 
Pt = transmitted peak power (at antenna terminals) 
P, = received power (at antenna terminals) 
G, = transmitting antenna power gain 
G, = receiving antenna power gain 
a = radar target cross section 
.l.. = radar wavelength 
Ft = transmitting antenna to target pattern-propagation factor 
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Fr = target to receiving antenna pattern-propagation factor 
L = system loss factor 
R = radar to target distance 
It is assumed that G1 = Gr = G. For a monostatic radar, this assumption 
leads to the conclusion that F1 = Fr = F. The factor F is defined as the ratio of the 
actual electric field strength Eat the target location, to that which would exist at the 
same distance from the radar in free space and in the antenna beam maximum-gain 
direction, E0 . Symbolically this is 
The propagation factor is a desirable quantity. It accounts for the 
possibility that the target is not located in the beam maximum and for any path 
related propagation gain or loss that would not occur in free space. The most 
common of such effects are atmospheric absorption, earth diffraction and shadowing, 
various types of refraction effects, and multipath interference. To compute the 
propagation factor, the program EREPS will be utilized [Ref. 5]. 
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B. EREPS OVERVIEW 
The Engineer's Refractive Effects Prediction System, or EREPS, is a set of 
stand-alone IBM/PC-compatible program which are designed to assist an engineer 
in properly assessing electromagnetic (EM) propagation effects of the lower 
atmosphere on proposed radar, electronic warfare, or communication systems. The 
EREPS models account for effects of optical interference, diffraction, tropospheric 
scattering, refraction, evaporation and surface-based ducting, and water-vapor 
absorption under horizontally stratified atmospheric conditions. 
EREPS revision 2.0 consists of five executable programs and a program source 
code listing in BASIC [Ref. 5]: 
1. PROPR 
PROPR generates a graphic display of propagation-loss, propagation-
factor, or radar signal-to-noise ra tio versus range under a variety of 
environmental conditions from which signal levels relative to a specified 
threshold or maximum free-space range can be determined. 
2. PROPH 
PROPH provides a graphic display similar to that given by PROPR except 
the signal strength or the propagation factor, etc., is plotted against the target 
height instead of the target range. 
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3. COVER 
COVER provides a height-versus-range graphic display showing the area 
where signal level meets or exceeds a specified threshold. 
4. RAYS 
RAYS displays the altitude-versus-range trajectories of a series of rays for 
the specified refractive-index profile. 
5. SDS 
SDS displays an annual climatological summary of the evaporation duct 
height and the surface-based duct height over each Marsden square on the 
earth's surface. SDS may be used as a source of environmental data for the 
programs PROPR, PROPH, and COVER. 
6. FFACTR 
FF ACTR is not an executable program but rather a program source code. 
It may be compiled external to the EREPS system to produce a stand-alone 
program or may be incorporated into a user program as a subroutine. 
FFACTR is structured as a subroutine that returns the one-way propagation 
factor in dB for specified environmental and EM system parameters. 
C. TARGET DESCRIPTION 
When an anticipated threat missile is not available or not desirable to be used 
for testing the performance requirements of a radar, a substitute target has to be 
employed. The test and evaluation plans should be developed using an available test 
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target. The pertinent performance requirements of the radar should also be specified 
in terms of the test target according to the test plan. Nothing about the threat 
missile need to be mentioned. In what follows,. the characteristics of the anticipated 
threat missile and the available test target are described. 
1. Threat Missile 
The missiles considered in the threat scenario used for establishing the 
operational requirements of the surveillance radar is a sophisticated air-, surface- and 
subsurface-launched anti-ship, RF-guided missile that incorporates a digital processor 
for progaming the missile funct ions. It can be launched from a platform far beyond 
the horizon of the new surveillance radar. Its trajectory is essentially platform 
independent during the midcourse and the terminal phases. 
a. Threat Missile Trajectory 
The midcourse and terminal trajectory of the anti-sh ip missile is shown in 
Fig. 11. For example, the missile can be dropped by an aircraft at an altitude of 
about a thousand meters at a distance about 80 km from the ship. It then descends 
to an altitude of about 30 meters in the first 20 km and cruises at that al titude at 
700 m/sec (about Mach 2). At about 4 km from the ship, the missile descends 
further to an altitude of 10 meters and flies straight to the ship. 
b. Threat Missile Characteristics 
The relevant characteristics of the anti-ship missile are as the following: 
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speed: 700 mjsec (about Mach 2) 
range: greater than 80 km (32.4 nmi) 
probability of kill: 0.95 
2. Test Target 
A fighter jet can be made available for the test and evaluation of the range 
performance of the new radar. The speed of the plane should be the same as that 
of the threat missile so that there will be no question about the integration gain due 
to doppler or moving target indicator (MTI) processing of the radar. Since a fighter 
has a radar cross section of about 10 square meters, the radar should be able to 
detect it at a greater range than that required to detect the threat missile. For safety, 
the airplane is to be flown at no lower than 100 meters above sea level, preferable 
in the 1000 to 3000 meters range. These are factors to be considered when a test 
and evaluation plan is designed and when the range performance of the radar is to 
be specified. 
The clutter environments are different at different ranges and at different 
heights. Great care has to be exercised in specifying the clutter suppression 
capability of the radar. At the range and height where the anticipated threat missile 
need to be detected, the radar should be required to reduce the clutter to the system 
thermal noise level or below. Then the detection probabilities of the radar for both 
the threat missile and the test plane is clutter independent. Note that due to the 
presence of the sea spikes, the false alarm rate is higher for the detection of the 
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threat missile. But the false alarm rate is a separate measurement which requires 
no involvement of a test target. The characteristics of the test target is given below: 
radar cross section (head-on): 10 m2 
cruise speed: at least 700 m/sec at the required altitude 
D. RADAR PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION 
According to Scenario 2 of Chapter II, the radar is required to detect, at a 
range of 10500 meters, a target of 0.1 m2 radar cross section flying at a height of 30 
m and a speed of 700 m/sec. Since a target of 10 m2 radar cross section flying at no 
lower than 100 meters will be used for test and evaluation, the radar range 
requirement should be specified in terms of the detection of a 10 m2 test target at 
a height of 100 meters. This specified range for the radar to detect the test target 
should be chosen so that the detection of the smaller, lower flying threat missile at 
10500 meters can be guaranteed. (Note that a different height can be used. The 
choice here of 100 meters for the altitude of the test target is completely arbitrary.) 
To guaranteed the successful detection of the threat missile, the propagation 
environment of the transmitted radar pulses has to be taken into account. In what 
follows, EREPS will be utilized to compute the radar received echo power as the 
cross section, height and range of a target is varied. 
1. Sample Radar Parameters 
It is meaningful, and may even be preferred, to specifying the delay time 
in detection of a search radar as one of its performance parameters, because the 
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delay time is used directly in simulating the threat scenarios in Chapter II. On the 
other hand, a surveillance radar is cu tomarily characterized in terms of its 
probability of detection and false alarm rate. In deed, the delay time in radar 
detection can be deduced from the probability of detection and other physical 
parameters of the radar, as the false alarm probability can usually be made so small 
that it seldom affects the detection capability of a radar. For example, consider a 
typical radar scanning at the rate of 15 rotations per minute (rpm), or 4 seconds per 
scan. Since a target may appear in a completely arbitrary direction, the mean delay 
time for detecting the target right after it enters the detection range is 2 seconds. If 
the protocol requires a confirmation during the second visit of the radar, the mean 
delay time for detection of the radar is 6 econds. To actually achieve this 6-second 
mean delay time at the 15 rpm scan rate, this radar must have an almost certain 
probability of detection for each visit. Hence if a vendor proposes a 15 rpm scan 
rate, the radar must be designed to have a probability of detection of at least 90%. 
Thus it may be desirable to leave the particular choice of the probability of detection 
and other mix of technical features to the radar supplier, so long as the vender 
claimed probability of detection and the delay time in radar detection can be tested 
and verified. 
Parameters of a typical radar which can achieve a 6-second mean delay 
time in radar detection is given in Table II. These parameters are used to establish 
the detection threshold of the radar and are used as input to EREPS. To establish 
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Table II Radar Parameters 
Antenna 
Transmitter 
Feed: rectangular horn 
Capability: Transmit/receive both radar and IFF energy 
Operation Temperature: -70C (94F) to + 70C (158C) 
Wind: Operating- 80 knots, Survival - 100 knots 
Antenna Gain: 23 dBi 
Polarization: Vertical 
Transmit Power Rating: 20 kw peak (minimum) 
Rotating Rate: 15 rpm 
Radar Characteristics: 
a. Operating Frequency: 1200 to 1300 MHZ 
b. Horizontal Beamwidth (3 dB): 5.7 degrees (nominal) 
c. Vertical Beamwidth (3dB): 16 degrees (minimum) 
Power Output: 
a. Peak: 12 kw minimum,b. Average: 260 w 
Duty Cycle: 
a. Low prf- 0.01527 b. high prf- 0.02081 
Prf: on scan-to-scan basis between 2500 pps and 3500pps 
Pulse Length: 6.5 microseconds 
Receiver-Processor 
IF Bandwidth (3dB): 130 KHZ 
Velocity Coverage: 
Two Scan: 80 to 2000 knots 
One Scan : 80% of two scan coverage 
Range Cell: 4.4 microseconds over 25 nmi 
minimum Range: 1 nmi 
Noise Figure: 5.5 dB maximum 
Clutter Cancellation Ratio: 57 dB minimum 
Sub Clutter Visibility: 54 dB minimum 
Minimum Discernible Signal: -110 dBm (maximum) 
False Alarm Rate: One false alarm per 21 hours (maximum) 
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the deviation and the probability distribution of the delay time, a more detailed study 
is required which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The detection threshold can be ~xpressed m terms of the detector 
threshold voltage, the minimum required signal, the propagation loss threshold, or 
the propagation factor threshold. In this thesis the propagation factor threshold is 
adopted because it turns out to be the most convenient. Note that the particular 
threshold value is irrelevant: if two different targets at two different locations 
provide a radar with equal amount of power, they should still return equal amount 
of power if the radar is replaced with a different radar of the same frequency. For 
any radar, the necessary amount of power arriving at the receiver required for 
detection by this radar is fixed. Thus if this radar can detect one of the two targets, 
it should be able to detect the other. 
The operating frequency listed in Table II requires special attention. The 
ratio between the propagation factors at two locations changes when the frequency 
is changed. The radar detection range has to be specified as a quantity dependent 
on the operating frequency. For this thesis, the operating frequency of 1200 to 1300 
MHz is used. 
2. Environmental Condition 
EREPS accepts refractive index profile for its computation. If the profile 
is measured locally, timely assessment of propagation effects on a radar system or a 
communication link can be performed. On the other hand, worldwide annual 
averages of climatological conditions are available from the SDS program. Figure 12 
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Figure 12 The annual averages of climatological conditions of TUNG KONG 
displays the data from a permanent oceanographic observation station located at 
TUNG KONG, CHINA (TAIWAN) (Latitude : 22.47 N, Longi tude: 120.43 E) as 
found in SDS at Marsden squares 96. Thi set of data is used as the environmental 
parameters for this thesis. 
3. Range Specification 
Given the radar listed in Table II and the desired probability of detection 
against a target of a particular radar cross section, EREPS can compute the detection 
threshold over different ranges in terms of the minimum required power at the 
receiving antenna. This detection threshold, presented as the required propagation 
factor at each range cell for the detection of the target in that cell , overlaid on the 
computed propagation factor between the radar and the target flying at some 
specified height, shows at a glance the regions in which the target can be detected. 
The propagation factor for the threat missile is given in Fig. 13. It shows 
that the radar first detects the missile at a range of 17.9 km. At 8.1 km, the missile 
disappears from the screen and is re-acquired at 6.5 km. Note that the one-way 
propagation factor is displayed . For radar applications, the round-trip dB value 
should be twice as large. 
The test target, having a cross ection of 10 m 2 and to fly at a height of 
100 m, can be detected by the same radar at a distance of 43.3 km as can be seen 
from Fig. 14. Hence the detection range of the new radar should be specified as 
43 .3 km against a 10 m 2 target flying at 700 km/sec at a height of 100 m. The test 
and evaluation plan should be designed according to this specification. 
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Figure 13 The propagation facto r for the threat miss ile 
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Figure 14 The propagation factor of the test ta rget 
4. Further Considerations 
It is obvious that, as the propagation environment changes, the propagation 
factor changes. For example, Fig. 15 shows an increase in detection range when 
there is a 40 m evaporation duct and a 10 knot wind. The radar detection range 
should not be determined based only on one set of propagation condition. The 
information about all possible propagation environments under which the radar will 
be operating should be reviewed. A reasonable value for the range specification, not 
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Figure _15 The propagation factor in an evaporation ducting condition 
IV CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, the problem of specifying system performance requirements which 
cannot be tested directly is considered. For the acquisition of a radar system to meet 
an anticipated missile threat, the Discrete-Event Simulation Model using the next-
event time-advance mechanism is utilized to generate the detection range 
requirement of the surveillance radar. 
Defending a ship against the anticipated threat is one performance requ irement 
that has to be tested. The missile of the threat scenario is not available for the test 
and evaluation of the performance of the radar. Through the use of EREPS, the 
concept of converting the impossible-to-test specification into one which can be easily 
tested is demonstrated. 
The effect of propagation environment on search radar performance is also 
demonstrated. If the radar has to perform under very different propagation 
conditions, the performance of the radar under all these conditions should be 
considered before the detection range requ irement can be determined. On the other 
hand, once the radar is deployed, test of the radar performance against a readily 
available target can be carried out regularly. EREPS can then be used to infer from 
the test result the detection range of the radar against a target at a different height. 
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ANTI-SHIP MISSILE Defense SIMULATION 
25 AUGUST 1990 
YU CHEN-KUO 
IBM 370 
* COMPILER WATFOR-77 
* DESCRIPTION : 
* THE PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO SIMULATE AN ANTI-SHIP MISSILE 
* Defense OPERATION. THE SCENARIO IS SET AS THE FOLLOWING: 






ANTI-SHIP MISSILES OF RED FORCE ARE LAUNCHED FROM EITHER 
A SHIP , A SUBMARINE OR AN AIRCRAFT BEYOND THE RADAR 
HORIZON OF A BLUE FORCE SHIP IN A WAVE OF MISSILES (TM) 
WITH A TIME LAPSE (TL) IN SECONDS BETWEEN EACH MISSILE 
LAUNCHED. 














(1) A BLUE FORCE SHIP IS FITTED WITH A MODERN SURFACE 
SURVEILLANCE RADAR, WHICH PROVIDES INITIAL TARGET 
INFORMATION ON THE ATTACK. THE TIME DELAY BETWEEN AN 
INCOMING MISSILE CROSSING THE RADAR DETECTION RANGE AND 
BEING DETECTED BY THE RADAR SYSTEM HAVE BEEN ASSUMED TO 
BE APPROXIMATELY NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED, WITH A MEAN DE LAY 
TIME (MM) AND A STANDARD DEVIATION (DM) IN SECOND. 
(2) THE AIR Defense CAPABILITY OF THE SHIP IS FITTED WITH 
TWO SHORT-RANGE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS. EACH 
SYSTEM HAS AN ASSOCIATED SINGLE-CHANNEL TRACKING RADAR. 
THE TRACKING RADARS ESTABLISH A TRACKING, AFTER AN 
.INCOMING MISSILE HAS BEEN DETECTED BY THE MODERN SURFACE 
SURVEILLANCE RADAR AND THE TRACKING RADAR IS FREE TO BE 
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* ASSIGNED, HAS BEEN ASSUMED TO BE APPROXIMATELY UNIFORMLY 
* DISTRIBUTED, WITH A MEAN DELAY TIME (MT) IN SECONDS AND 
* STANDARD DEVIATION (DT) IN SECONDS. 
* (3) THE SHIP HAS APPROPRIATELY INSTALLED TWO CLOSE-IN WEAPON 
* SYSTEM (CIWS). EACH CIWS HAS ITS OWN RADAR TO PROVIDE 
* THE GUN TRACKING INFORMATION. WHEN A TARGET ENTER ITS 
* ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE, THE GUNS ARE AUTOMATICALLY ATTACKING 
* THIS TARGET AND BEGIN TO FIRE. THE FIRING CONTINUES UNTIL 
* THE TARGET CROSSES THE MINIMUM FIRING RANGE. 
* (4) THE SHORT-RANGE SURFACE-TO- AIR WEAPON SYSTEM FCS #1 WILL 
* AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE A TARGET WHICH ENTER ITS ENGAGEMENT 
* ENVELOPE. IF MORE THAN ONE ARE AVAILABLE OR THE FIRST 
* SYSTEM IS BUSY, THEN THE CIWS #1 WILL AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE 
* EXCEPT IN THE CASE WHERE THE CIWS #1 IS BUSY OR THE 
* TARGET IS OUTSIDE ITS ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE. 
* (5) IF THE TARGET IS AT OUTSIDE THE CIWS' ENGAGEMENT 
* ENVELOPE , THE FCS #2 WILL IMMEDIATELY ENGAGE THIS TARGET 
* EXCEPT THE FCS #2 IS BUSY ALSO . 
* (6) WHEN BOTH CIWS & FCS ARE BUSY, OR TWO FCS ARE BUSY AN D 
* THE TARGET IS OUTSIDE THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOP OF CIWS, THE 
* TARGETS ARRIVED WILL BE PUT IN A WAITING POSITION UNTIL 
* ONE FCS IS FREE OR IT ENTERS THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE OF 
* CIWS. 
* 3. PERFORMANCE DATA: 










MISSILE RADAR CROSS SECTION= 0.1 SQ. METER 
VELOCITY : SPM METER/SECOND 
COMBINED IN-FLIGHT RELIABILITY AND HIT PROBABILITY 
FOR EACH MISSILE IS PM 
(2) .THE SHORT-RANGE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE OF BLUE FORCE: 
MINIMUM LAUNCH RANGE = RMI METERS 
MAXIMUM LAUNCH RANGE = RMA METERS 
AVERAGE MISSILE VELOCITY = SPA METER/SECOND 






HIT/KILL PROBABILITY = PA2 
(3) .THE CLOSE-IN WEAPON SYSTEMS OF BLUE FORCE: 
MINIMUM FIRE RANGE 
MAXIMUM FIRE RANGE 
RMIC METERS 
RMAC METERS 
* KILL PROBABILITY = 0.2/SECOND * ENGAGE TIME 
* THIS PROGRAM IS USED TO FIND THE Defe nse CAPABILITY OF THE BLUE 
* FORCE SHIP AT DIFFERENT RADAR DETECTION RANGES. THROUGH RESULTS 
* OF THIS SIMULATION WE CAN EASILY DETERMINE WHICH DETECTION RANGE 
* IS REQUIRED FOR OUR NEW SURVEILLANCE RADAR. 
* 
********************************* ******** ************************** 
** 





















* * NIQ 
VARIABLES, PARAMETERS , AND FUNCTIONS 
DEVIATION OF DELAY TIME BY USING SURVEILLANCE RADAR TO 
DETECT AN ANTI-SHIP MISSILES 
THE DETECTION RANGE OF BLUE FORCE SURVEILLANCE RADAR 
DEVIATION OF DELAY TIME BY USING TRACKI NG RADAR TO 
ESTABLISH A TRACKING 
A VARIABLE OF WHETHER THE SHIP IS HIT(=l) OR NO(=O) 
INCREMENT OF DETECTION RANGE 
SEED USED IN NORMAL DISTRIBUTION RANDOM NUMBER 
GENERATOR 
SEEDS USED IN UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION RANDOM NUMBER 
GENERATOR 
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION 
UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 
MEAN DELAY TIME BY USING SURVEILLANCE RADAR TO DETECT 
ANTI-SHIP MISSILE 
MEAN DELAY TIME BY USING TRACKING RADAR TO ESTABLISH 
A TRACK 
NUMBER OF EVENTS 
SCHEDULE THE NEXT ROUTE 
NUMBER OF THE MISSILES HIT OF BLUE FORCE 


































NUMBER OF MISSILES RED FORCE LUNCHED 
NUMBER OF RUN 
P1 (OR 2) : KILL PROBABILITY OF CIWS #1(0R 2), WHICH IS A PRODUCT 





















KILL PROBABILITY OF THE SHORT RANGE AIR- TO-AIR 
MISSILES 
RELIABILITY AND KILL PROBABILITY OF THE ANTI-SHIP 
MISSILES 
MAX. EFFECT RANGE OF THE ANTI-SHIP MISSILES 
MAX. EFFECT RANGE OF THE SHORT RANGE SURFACE- TO - AIR 
MISSILES 
MIN. EFFECT RANGE OF THE ANTI-SHIP MISSILES 
MI N. EFFECT RANGE OF THE SHORT RANGE AIR-TO-AIR 
MISSILES 
SPEED OF THE SHORT RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES 
SPEED OF THE ANTI-SHIP MISSILES 
START DETECTION RANGE 
THE STATES OF A WEAPON SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM IS BUSY(=1) 
OR IDLE(=O) 
CLOCK OF THIS SIMULATION 
TIME LAPSE BETWEEN EACH ANTI-SHIP MISSILE LAUNCHED 
NUMBER OF TOTAL MISSILE LUNCHED BY RED FORCE 
THE TIME OF THE NEXT EVENT. 
THE TIME OF THE FIRST AND NEXT MISSILE IS DETECTED 
THE TIME OF THE FCS #1 FINISHES ENGAGEMENT 
THE TIME OF THE CIWS #1 FINISHES ENGAGEMENT 
THE TIME OF THE FCS #2 FINISHES ENGAGEMENT 
THE TIME OF THE CIWS #2 FINISHES ENGAGEMENT 
: THE MAXIMUM RUNNING TIME 
***************************************************************** 
c 
C MAIN PROGRAM 
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c 
INTEGER NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS(4), IX(3), TM, NR, NH, 
&HT 
REAL SR, IR, SPM, SPA, PM, PA, TL, MM, DM, MT, DT, RMA, RMI, 
&RMAC, RMIC, RA, DR, TT, TIME, TNE(5) 
COMMON /MODEL/NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR, IX 
*** SPECIFY POSITIVE SEEDS FOR NORMAL DISTRIBUTION RANDOM NUMBER 
*** GENERATOR AND UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR. 
c 
DO 01 I=1, 3 
IX(I)=1103205531 
01 CONTINUE 
*** REQUEST TO INPUT PARAMETERS 
PRINT*, 'INPUT REAL PARAMETERS, THE ORDERS ARE AS THE FOLLOW 
&ING: I 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'START DETECTION RANGE, DETECTION RANGE INCREMENT(ME 
&TER) I 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'SPEED OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILES, AND SHORT RANGE AAMS 
& (M/ SEC) I 
PRINT * 
PRINT*, 'THE RELIABILITY AND KILL PROBABILITY OF ANTI-SHI P 
&MISSILE ' 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'THE KILL PROBABILITY OF THE SHORT RANGE AAMS' 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'TIME LAPS BETWEEN EACH ANTI-SHIP MISSILE LAUNCHED' 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'MEAN DELAY TIME AND DEVIATION OF AN ANTI-SHIP MISSILE 




PRINT*, 'MEAN DELAY TIME AND DEVIATION OF COMBAT SYSTEM 
&ESTABLISHES A TRACK (SECOND) I 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'MAX . AND MIN . EFFECT RANGE OF THE SHORT RANGE 
&SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (METERS) I 
PRINT* 
PRINT* , 'MAX . AND MIN. EFFECT RANGE OF CIWS (METERS).' 
PRINT* 
PRINT*, 'PUT A SPACE BETWEEN EACH ONE. 1 
READ(*, *)SR, IR, SPM, SPA, PM, PA, TL, MM, DM, MT, DT, RMA, 
&RMI, RMAC, RMIC 
*** OPEN A FILE TO WRITE RESULTS. 
OPEN( UNIT=6, STATUS='OLD', FILE='TH RESULT') 
c 
*** RUN FOR THE RESULTS AT DIFFERENT NUMBER OF THE TOTAL MISSILE 
DO 300 I=5, 8 
TM=I 
WRITE (6, 02) 
02 FORMAT('INPUT REAL PARAMETERS FOR THIS RUN ARE AS THE FOLLOW 
&ING: I) 
WRITE (6, 03)TM 
03 FORMAT('THE ANTI-SHIP MISSILE: (TOTAL NUMBER OF THE MISSILES 
&IS \' I2' \ ) I) 
WRITE (6, 04)SPM 
04 FORMAT(8 X, 'SPEED', 17X, F7.2, lX' M/SEC') 
WRITE (6, 05)PM 
05 FORMAT(8X, 'RELIABILITY AND KILL PROBABI LITY', 5X, F4.3) 
WRITE(6, 06)TL 
06 FORMAT(8X, 'TIME LAPS BETWEEN EACH MISSILE LAUNCHED', lX, 
&F4. 2, lX, 'SECOND') 
WRITE (6, *)'THE SHORT RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: 1 




08 FORMAT(8X, 'SPEED', 17X, F7.2, 2X, ' M/SEC') 
WRITE (6, 09)PA 
09 FORMAT(8X, 'KILL PROBABILITY', lOX, F3.2) 
WRITE (6, lO)RMA 
10 FORMAT(8X, 'MAX. EFFECT RANGE', 5X, F8.2, 2X, 'METERS') 
WRITE (6, ll)RMI 
11 FORMAT(8X, 'MIN. EFFECT RANGE', 5X, F8.2, 2X, 'METERS' ) 
WRITE (6, *)'CLOSE-IN WEAPON SYSTEM: ' 
WRITE (6, 12)RMAC 
12 FORMAT(8 X, 'MAX . EFFECT RANGE', 5X, F8.2, 2X, 'METERS') 
WRITE (6, 13)RMIC 
13 FORMAT(8X, 'MIN. EFFECT RANGE', 5X, F8.2, 2X, 'METERS') 
WRITE (6, *)'USING SURVEILLANCE RADAR TO DETECT ANTI-SHIP MISS 
&ILE: I 
WRITE (6, 14) MM 
14 FORMAT(BX, 'MEAN DELAY TIME', lO X, F5.2, 2X, 'SECOND') 
WRITE (6, 15)DM 
15 FORMAT(8 X, 'WITH DEVIATION', llX, F5.2, 2X, 'SECOND') 
WRITE(6, *)'USING TRACKING RADAR TO ESTABLISH A TRACK: 1 
WRITE (6, 16)MT 
1 6 FORMAT(B X, 'MEAN DELAY TIME ', lOX, F5.2, 2X, ' SECOND') 
WRITE (6, 17)DT 
17 FORMAT(8 X, 'WITH DEVIATION', llX, F5.2 , 2X, 'S ECOND') 
WRITE (6, *) 
WRITE (6, *) 
WRITE (6, *) 
*** RUN FOR FOURTY DIFFERENT DETECTION RANGE IN ORDER TO FIND A 
*** MIN.RANGE WHICH SATISFIES WITH SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPLETE THE 
*** OPERATIONAL 95 % CONFIDENCE INTERVAL. 
DO 200 J=l, 40 
c 
*** DETECTION RANGES START AT 7500 METERS AND INCREASE 500 METERS. 




*** SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF EVENTS (NEVENTS) FOR TIMING ROUTINE. 
NEVENTS=5 
c 




*** DETERMINE THE MAXIMUM RUNNING TIME 
TT=(DR/SPM)+TL*(TM-1) 
c 
*** COLLECT THE DATA OF RUNNING 1000 TIMES. 
DO 100 K=1, 10 00 
c 




CALL INIT(MM , DM, TL ) 
CHECK WHETHER TIME IS OVER. 
18 IF(TIME.LT.TT ) GO TO 20 
GO TO 90 
*** DETERMINE NEXT EVENT WHICH WILL BE CALLED BY USING SUBROUTINE 
*** TIM, AND GO TO AN APPROPRIATE SITUATION ROUTINE. 
20 CALL TIM 
GO TO (30, 4 0, 50, 60, 70), NEXT 
c 
*** CALL SUBROUTINE ENG TO SCHEDULE NEXT EVENT AND TO SIMULATE AN 
*** ENGAGEMENT . 
c 
30 CALL ENG(NH, RA, SPM, SPA, PM, PA, TL, MM, DM, MT, DT, RMA, 
&RMI , RMAC, RMI C) 
*** IF THE SHIP OF BLUE FORCE IS HIT BY ANTI-SHIP MISSILE, THEN END 




*** SURVEILLANCE RADAR OF BLUE FORCE AND GO ON RUNNING. 
c 
IF (HT.EQ.1) GO TO 90 
NM= NM+1 
GO TO 80 
*** AFTER ENGAGEMENT CALL AN APPROPRIATE SUBROUTINE DEP TO CHECK 
*** WHETHER THE QUEUE IS EMPTY AND TO SCHEDULE A DEPARTURE. 
40 CALL DEP1 
GO TO 80 
50 CALL DEP2 
GO TO 80 
60 CALL DEP3 
GO TO 80 
70 CALL DEP4 
c 
*** CHECK I F THE NUMBER OF MISSILE ARRIVED IS LESS/EQUAL TO THE 
*** NUMBER OF TOTAL MISSILES. 




*** SINCE THE SIMULATION OF ONE DETECTION RANGE HAS FINISHED, CALL 
*** SUBROUTI NE REPT TO GENERATE A REPORT . 
c 







SUBROUTINE INIT(MM, DM, TL) 
INTEGER NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS(4), IX(J), HT 
REAL TT, TIME, DR, TNE (5) , A(1), MM, DM, TL 
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c 
COMMON /MODEL/ NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR, IX 
*** INITIALIZE THE SIMULATION CLOCK 
TIME = 0. 
c 
*** INITIALIZE THE VARIABLE OF WHETHER THE SHIP IS HIT OR NOT 
HT=O 
c 










*** INITIALIZE THE EVENT LIST. SINCE NO MISSILE ARE PRESENT, 
*** SCHEDULE THE TIME OF THE FIRST MISSILE IS DETECTED, AND THE 
*** TIME OF THE NEXT DEPARTURE IS SET TO "INFINITY". 
c 













INTEGER NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS(4), IX(J) 
REAL TT, TIME , DR, TNE(5), RMIN 
COMMON /MODEL/NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR, IX 
* ** SET A DUMMY VARIABLE 
RMIN=1.E+29 
c 
*** DETERMINE THE EVENT TYPE OF THE NEXT EVENT TO OCCUR. 
c 
DO 10 I=1, NEVENTS 











SUBROUTINE ENG (NH, RA, SPM , SPA , PM, PA, TL, MM, DM, MT, DT, 
&RMA , RMI , RMAC, RMI C) 
INTEGER NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ , NM, STATUS( 4), IX( J) , HT 
REAL SPM, SPA, PM, PA, TL, MM, DM, MT, DT, RMA, RMI, RMAC, 
&RMIC, TT, TIME, DR, TNE(5) , RA, A(1) 
COMMON /MODEL/NEVENTS, NEXT , NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR, I X 
*** SCHEDULE A DETECTED TIME OF THE NEXT ARRIVING MISSILE 




*** IF THE FCS #1 IS BUSY (STATUS=1) , AUTOMATICALLY LET CIWS #1 
*** HANDLE THE ARRIVING MISSILE. IF THE FCS #1 IS IDLE (STATUS=O), 
*** START THE ENGAGEMENT ROUTE OF FCS #1. 
IF(STATUS(1) .EQ.1) GO TO 20 
c 
*** DETERMINE THE TIME OF THE FCS #1 ESTABLISHES A TRACKING 
CALL LRND(IX(2), A, 1, 1, 0) 
TIME=TIME+DT*A(1)+MT 
c 
*** CALCULATE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TRACKED MISSILE AND THE SHIP 
*** WHEN THE MISSILE IS TRACKED BY FCS #1. 
10 RA=DR-SPM*(TIME-TL*NM) 
c 
*** CHECK WHETHER THE MISSILE IS AT OUTSIDE OF THE ENGAGEMENT 
*** ENVELOPE OF FCS #1. IF THE DISTANCE IS LARGER THAN THE MAX. 
*** ATTACKING RANGE OF FCS #1, THEN SCHEDULE THE TIME OF THE 
*** MISSILE CROSSING THE RANGE. IF THE DISTANCE IS SMALLER THAN THE 
*** MIN. ATTACKING RANGE OF FCS #1, THEN LET CIWS #1 AUTOMATICALLY 
*** ENGAGE THE MISSILE. 
c 
IF(RA.GT.RMA) GO TO 11 
IF(RA.LT.RMI) GO TO 20 
*** THE MISSILE IS WITHIN THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE OF FCS #1, UPDATE 
*** THE STATE OF FCS #1. 
STATUS(1)=1 
*** DETERMINE THE ENGAGEMENT TIME 
TIME=RA/(SPM+SPA)+TIME 
c 
*** DETERMINE WHETHER THE FCS #1 SUCCESSFULLY INTERCEPTS THE 
*** MISSILE BY RUNNING A UNIFORM DISTRBUTION RANDOM NUMBER 
***GENERATOR WITH SEED IX3. IF IT IS NOT, THEN DO THE ABOVE ROUTE 
*** AGAIN. IF IT IS, THEN SCHEDULE THE INTERCEPTION TIME. 
CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1, 0) 





*** CALCULATE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE MISSILE AND THE SHIP WHEN 
*** THE MISSILE IS GOING TO BE TRACKED BY CIWS #1. 
20 RA=DR-SPM*(TIME-TL*NM) 
c 
*** CHECK WHETHER THE MISSILE IS AT OUTSIDE THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE 
*** OF CIWS#1. IF THE DISTANCE IS LARGER THAN THE MAX. ATTACKING 
*** RANGE OF CIWS#1, THEN LET FCS #2 AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE THE 
*** MISSILE. IF THE DISTANCE IS SMALLER THAN THE MINIMUM ATTACKING 
*** RANGE OF CIWS #1, THEN GO TO THE ROUTE OF DECISION WHETHER THE 
*** SHIP IS HIT. IF CIWS #1 IS BUSY, THEN LET CIWS #2 AUTOMATICALLY 
*** ENGAGE THE MISSILE EXCEPT IT IS BUSY ALSO. 
c 
IF(RA.GT.RMAC) GO TO 30 
IF(RA.LT.RMIC) GO TO 13 
IF(STATUS(2) .EQ.1) GO TO 25 
*** THE MISSILE IS WITHIN THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE OF CIWS #1 , 
*** UPDATE THE STATE OF CIWS #1. 
STATUS(2)=1 
c 
*** CALCULATE THE KILL PROBABILITY OF CIWS #1 
P1=(RA/SPM)*0.2 
c 
*** DECIDE WHETHER CIWS #1 KILLS THE ENGAGED MISSILE . 
c 
CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1, 0) 
IF(A(1) .GT.P1) GO TO 13 






*** CHECK WHETHER THE CIWS #2 IS BUS Y. IF IT IS, GO TO THE FINAL 
*** HIT ROUTE. IF IT IS NOT, LET CIWS #2 ENGAGE THIS TARGET. 
25 IF(STATUS (4 ) .EQ.1) GO TO 13 
STATUS( 4) =1 
c 
*** CALCULATE THE KILL PROBABILITY OF CIWS #2 
P2=(RA/SPM)* 0. 2 
c 
*** DECIDE WHETHER CIWS #2 KILLS THE ENGAGED MISSILE. 
c 
CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1 , 0) 
IF(A(1 ) .GT.P2) GO TO 13 





*** FINAL HIT ROUTE: DECIDE IF THE SHIP IS HIT BY A MISSILE 
13 CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1, 0) 
IF (A(1) .GT.PM) GO TO 14 




*** SCHEDULE THE TIME THAT THE MISSILE CROSS ES THE MAX. RANGE OF 
*** CIWS #2 
11 TIME=(DR-RMA+1.)/ SPM+TL*NM 
GO TO 10 
C***************************************************************** 
*** IF THE FCS #2 IS BUSY (STATUS=1) 1 AUTOMATICALLY LET CIWS #2 
*** HANDLE THE ARRIVING MISSILE. IF THE FCS #2 IS IDLE (STATUS= O) , 
*** START THE ENGAGEMENT ROUTE OF FCS #2. 
30 IF(STATUS (3 ) . EQ .1) GO TO 50 
c 
66 
*** DETERMINE THE TIME OF THE FCS #2 ESTABLISHES A TRACKING 
CALL LRND(IX(2), A, 1, 1, 0) 
TIME=TIME+DT*A(1)+MT 
c 
*** CALCULATE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TRACKED MISSILE AND THE SHIP 
*** WHEN THE MISSILE IS TRACKED BY FCS #2. 
40 RA=DR-SPM*(TIME-TL* NM ) 
c 
*** CHECK WHETHER THE MISSILE IS AT OUTSIDE THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE 
*** OF FCS #2 . I F THE DISTANCE I S LARGER THAN THE MAX. ATTACKING 
*** RANGE OF FCS #2, THEN SCHEDULE THE TIME OF THE MISSILE CROSSING 
*** THE RANGE. IF THE DISTANCE IS SMALLER THAN THE MIN. ATTACKI NG 
*** RANGE OF FCS #2 , THEN LET CIWS #2 AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE THE 
*** MISSILE. 
c 
IF(RA.GT.RMA ) GO TO 31 
IF(RA.LT.RMI ) GO TO 50 
*** THE MISSILE IS WI THI N THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE OF FCS #2, UPDATE 
*** THE STATE OF FCS #2 . 
STATUS(3)=1 
c 
** * DETERMI NE THE ENGAGEMENT TIME 
TIME=RA/ (SPM+SPA)+TIME 
c 
*** DETERMINE WHETHER THE FCS #2 SUCCESSFULLY INTERCEPTS THE 
*** MISSILE BY RUNN I NG A UNIFORM DISTRBUTION RANDOM NUMBER 
*** GENERATOR WITH SEED IX3. IF IT IS NOT, THEN DO THE ABOVE ROUTE 
*** AGAI N. I F IT IS, THEN SCHEDULE THE INTERCEPTION TIME. 
c 
CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1, 0) 
IF(A(1 ) .GT.PA) GO TO 40 
TNE(4 )=TIME 
RETURN 
*** CALCULATE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE MISSILE AND THE SHIP WHEN 
67 
*** THE MISSILE IS GOING TO BE TRACKED BY CIWS #2. 
50 RA=DR-SPM*(TIME-TL*NM) 
c 
*** CHECK WHETHER THE MISSILE IS AT OUTSIDE OF THE ENGAGEMENT 
*** ENVELOPE OF CIWS #2. IF THE DISTANCE IS LARGER THAN THE MAX. 
*** ATTACKING RANGE OF CIWS #2, THEN PUT IT IN QUEUE. IF THE 
*** DISTANCE IS SMALLER THAN THE MIN. ATTACKING RANGE OF CIWS #2, 
*** THEN GO TO FINAL HIT ROUTE, AND DECIDE WHETHER THE SHIP IS HI T . 
*** IF CIWS #2 IS BUSY, THEN LET CIWS #1 AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE THE 
*** MISSILE EXCEPT IT IS BUSY ALSO. 
c 
IF(RA.GT.RMIC) GO TO 60 
IF(RA.LT.RMAC) GO TO 33 
IF(STATUS(4) .EQ.1) GO TO 35 
*** THE MISSILE IS WITHIN THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE OF CIWS #2, 
*** UPDATE THE STATE OF CIWS #2. 
STATUS(4)=1 
c 
*** CALCULATE THE KILL PROBABILITY OF CIWS #2 
P2=(RA/SPM)*0.2 
c 
*** DECIDE WHETHER CIWS #2 KILLS THE ENGAGED MISSILE. 
c 
CALL LRND(IX ( 3) I A, 1, 1, 0) 
IF(A(1) .GT.P1) GO TO 33 





*** CHECK WHETHER THE CIWS #1 IS BUSY. IF IT IS, GO TO THE FINAL 
*** HIT 
*** ROUTE. IF IT IS NOT, LET CIWS #1 ENGAGE THIS TARGET. 







*** CALCULATE THE KILL PROBABILITY OF CIWS #1 
P1=(RA/SPM)*0.2 
c 
*** DECIDE WHETHER CIWS #2 KILLS THE ENGAGED MISSILE. 
c 
CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1 , 0) 
IF(A(1) .GT.P1) GO TO 33 





*** FINAL HIT ROUTE: DECIDE IF THE SHIP IS HIT BY A MISSILE 
33 CALL LRND(IX(3), A, 1, 1, 0) 





*** SCHEDULE THE TIME THAT THE MISSILE CROSSES THE MAX. RANGE OF 
*** CIWS #2 
c 
31 TIME=(DR-RMA+l.)/SPM+TL*NM 
GO TO 30 
*** IF ALL OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS ARE BUSY, OR FCSS' ARE BUSY AND THE 
*** TARGET IS OUTSIDE THE ENGAGEMENT ENVELOPE OF CIWSS, THEN PUT 









INTEGER NIQ, STATUS(4), IX(3) 
REAL TNE(5) 
COMMON /MODEL/NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR , IX 
*** MAKE FCS #1 TO IDLE 
STATUS(l ) =O 
c 
*** CHECK NUMBER IN QUEUE 
IF (NIQ.GT.O ) GO TO 50 
TNE(2)=1.E+30 
RETURN 
50 NIQ=NIQ- 1 








INTEGER NIQ, STATUS(4), IX(3) 
REAL TNE (5) 
COMMON /MODEL/NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR, I X 
STATUS(2 ) =0 
IF (NIQ. GT .O ) GO TO 50 
TNE(3)=l.E+3 0 
RETURN 












INTEGER NIQ, STATUS(4), IX(3) 
REAL TNE(5) 
COMMON /MODEL/NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE , 
&TIME, DR, IX 
STATUS(3)=0 
IF (NIQ.GT.O) GO TO 50 
TNE ( 4) =1. E+30 
RETURN 
NIQ=NIQ-1 
TNE ( 4) =1. E+30 







INTEGER NIQ, STATUS(4), IX(3) 
REAL TNE(5) 
COMMON / MODE L/NEVENTS, NEXT, NIQ, NM, STATUS, TT, HT, TNE, 
&TIME, DR, IX 
STATUS(4)=0 












SUBROUTINE REPT(DR, NR, NH) 
REAL PS 
INTEGER NR, NH 
WRITE(6, lO)DR 
10 FORMAT('DR = ', F8.2, 2X, 'METERS') 
WRITE(6, 20)NR 
20 FORMAT(5 X, 'NUMBER OF RUNS', 3X, I4) 
WRITE(6, 30)NH 
30 FORMAT(5 X, ' NUMBER OF HITS', 4X, I4) 
PS=((NR-NH)*l OO./NR) 
WRITE( 6, 40)PS 
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